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FORMALIZATION, POSSESSION, AND OWNERSHIP

THOMAS W. MERRILL*
This paper is a comment on the work of Hernando de Soto, who has
done so much to highlight the importance of property rights, especially in the context of what I will call migrant communities within
developing countries. These are the shantytowns of Peru, the favelas
of Brazil, and the bidonvilles of Haiti. De Soto characterizes these communities as “extralegal zones.” They consist, in his words, of “modest
homes cramped together on city perimeters, a myriad of workshops
in their midst, armies of vendors hawking their wares on the streets,
and countless crisscrossing minibus lines.”1 I am interested in de
Soto’s work on these migrant communities for two reasons, which
are related.
First, de Soto’s work sheds important light on a problem in property theory with which I have been concerned for several years. This
has to do with the distinction between two different ways for allocating
resources among humans living together in some kind of organized
society—possession and ownership.2 There is a broad divide among
property scholars between “Humeans” who see informal possessory
rights as the origins of property, and “Hobbesians” who see the State
as the critical institution that gives rise to claims of property.3 De
Soto’s migrant communities are organized according to claims of possession that are extra-legal, that is, they are not sanctioned by the
State. So they provide an important piece of data bearing on the
causal debate about the origins of property.
Second, de Soto’s work has spawned a worldwide reform effort that
seeks to jump start economic growth in developing countries by
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School
1. HERNANDO DE SOTO , THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 78–79 (2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO , MYSTERY].
2. Thomas Merrill, Ownership and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION
(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3
BRIGHAM -KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 13–21 (2014).
3. The distinction is often expressed in terms of whether property emerges “bottom up”
(evolving out of social norms) or “top down” (is imposed by the State). See James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2009); Thomas W.
Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD . S331 (2002).

113

114

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:113

formalizing the informal possessory rights that exist in migrant communities, that is, by transforming extra-legal possessory rights into
legal property rights.4 The primary rationale for such formalization
programs is to make these claims eligible for use as collateral for
loans, which in turn will provide the capital needed to build structures, obtain equipment and inventory, and enter the world of modern
capitalism. This idea has been tremendously influential with international aid agencies and the World Bank and has been adopted, in
one form or another, by a large number of developing countries
throughout the world.5 The results have largely been disappointing.6
Once we pinpoint the key information-cost distinction between systems that allocate resources by possession and those that use ownership, we can come to an understanding of why the formalization
projects have largely failed in their stated objectives. This understanding also points toward alternative reforms that may have greater
chances of success.
I. THE THEORETICAL ISSUE
Possession is a social concept. It refers to a claim by a person of exclusive control of a physical object. It is grounded in actual control.
One cannot gain possession simply by pointing to an object or taking
a picture of it. Once actual control is obtained, however, possession
does not require continuous control. It is sufficient to mark the object
in such a way as to signal to others that one intends to retain control of the object.
The institution of possession is a universal feature of all known
human societies, including hunter-gatherer bands. The objects eligible for claims of possession vary considerably from one society to
another, as do the marks that signal to others that an object is possessed. No matter how claims of possession are communicated, in
reasonably stable human societies there is a strong disposition to
respect possession established by others. To be sure, there is variation here too, as some societies have higher rates of thievery than
4. Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Registration, Governance, and Development:
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 24 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 233 (2009).
5. For further discussion of the formalization projects, see infra Part II.
6. See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
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others and there is often, unfortunately, a marked fall-off in respect
for possession by out-groups relative to in-groups. But respect for
possession exists, to some degree, even within bands of thieves.7
Ownership is a legal concept. Like possession, it refers to control
over things. Ownership, however, refers to a legally enforceable right
to exclusive control of a thing. In a society with a functioning legal
system, ownership trumps possession. Ownership is also broader
than possession because it is not limited to physical objects. One can
own intellectual property rights, shares in companies, security interests, money, and lots of other things that are intangible.
The main point I would emphasize for present purposes is that
every moderately sophisticated society with a functioning legal system will rely on both possession and ownership in allocating rights
to resources. It is a mistake to think of possession as some rudimentary state of affairs that prevails in primitive societies but which is
eventually replaced by ownership as development takes off. Even in
the most advanced societies, possession is by far the most frequently
used basis for allocating claims to resources.
In navigating through everyday life, for example, we make thousands of judgments about whether particular resources are claimed
or unclaimed. Think of our response to cars in a parking lot, houses
along a street, coats on a coat-rack, and goods piled up on the sidewalk in front of a shop. We make judgments about whether these
objects are claimed or unclaimed based on perceptions about whether
someone has signaled an intention to retain possession of the object
in question. We do not ponder whether they are owned, and if so, by
whom and in what sort of title. Even when we engage in transactions, most of the time we rely on possession as a sufficient basis for
the right to engage in exchange. This applies to nearly all transactions in relatively low-valued goods, like food, clothing, books, and
so forth. When you buy a bottle of water from a street vendor, you
do not stop to ponder whether the vendor owns the bottles of water.
You assume, based on his possession of the bottles, that he has the
right to sell them.
Ownership, in contrast, comes into play only in relatively specialized contexts. These are typically high-stakes situations, such as
7. See Thomas W. Merrill, Possession as a Natural Right, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 345,
356–63 (2015) (and sources cited).
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resolving a boundary dispute over land, establishing whether the
seller has good title when buying a house or car, or determining
whether to loan money to someone secured by collateral.
The reason why possession is used most of the time and ownership
comes into play only exceptionally is primarily a matter of information costs. Determinations of possession are based on physical cues
about objects that are processed by our brains almost instantaneously and unconsciously. They exist in the realm of cognition that
Daniel Kahneman has called “system 1” or “thinking fast.”8 Somehow we learn these cues at a very young age, just by observing how
people interact with objects of value.
Determinations of ownership, in contrast, entail much higher
information costs. In order to identify someone as the “owner” of a
thing it is necessary to trace its provenance in order to ascertain that
the relevant rights (paradigmatically to exclude others) have not
previously been transferred to someone else.9 Such a determination
may entail commissioning a survey, finding documents memorializing past transactions, figuring out what these documents mean,
perhaps consulting some kind of registry of rights, possibly hiring
a lawyer to sort all this out, and maybe even filing a lawsuit. Even
the most streamlined of these enquiries requires a conscious effort
to gather information and decide what it means. Determining ownership is a quintessential example of what Kahneman calls “system 2”
cognition or “thinking slow.”10
Once we see that possession is an informationally cheap way of
allocating rights to resources, whereas ownership is an informationally expensive way of allocating resources, we can see why possession
remains the predominate principle for most everyday purposes. And
this is true in even the most sophisticated societies with the most
elaborate systems of property rights and enforcement of those rights.
What remains controversial about this account of possession and
its relation to ownership is a question of causation. My view, which
you could call neo-Humean or perhaps a sociobiological view, is that
there is something we can call the “possession instinct” which is
8. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
9. Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON . & ORG .
401 (2003).
10. KAHNEMAN , supra note 8.
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hard wired in human psychology.11 People everywhere have a natural proclivity to identify certain objects as being possessed by others,
and a natural proclivity to respect possession established by others.
Obviously, it is not all biological; the possession instinct is significantly mediated by culture and by individual learning. But if a group
of strangers, each from a different culture, were stranded on a desert
island, they would quickly develop a normative understanding of
which objects or places on the island belong to whom, and there
would be widespread respect for this understanding.
The opposing view, which has been informally advanced on several occasions in response to my views, can be called neo-Hobbesian.
This is the view that possession only works as a basis for allocating
resources because it is backstopped by the power of the State. Take
one of my favorite examples of the use of possession in the modern
world—the luggage carousel at an international airport. People from
all over the world and all sorts of cultural backgrounds understand
that they are entitled to take only the suitcase uniquely marked as
their own; they understand they are not to interfere with suitcases
marked as belonging to someone else. The process works the same
at airports all over the world and most of the time operates without
any official checking of claim tags, once bags are retrieved.
To which the neo-Hobbesians respond: The system of suitcase
allocation works only because everyone understands that someone,
somewhere, is the legal owner of each of these suitcases. Particular
suitcases may be borrowed, or may even be stolen. But each is owned
by someone. We learn in our youth that taking property owned by
someone else is a crime, punishable by the State. So we desist from
taking a suitcase that we perceive is not our own, because we fear
the power of the State. In this particular example, possession may
serve up the cues as to who is entitled to what, but it is functioning
simply as a proxy for ownership. Ownership supplies the underlying
explanation for the respect for possession.12
What I like about de Soto’s account of the migrant communities in
the developing world is that it presents a kind of natural experiment
for testing these rival theories. As he describes the circumstances of
11. Merrill, supra note 7.
12. Cf. Carol M. Rose, The Law is Nine-Tenths of Possession: An Adage Turned on Its
Head, in 40 LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Change ed., 2015) (arguing that
possession is best explained by “acting like an owner”).
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these communities, they are essentially outlaws from the perspective of the formal system of property rights. The people living in
these communities inhabit handmade structures built on land they
do not own. They operate businesses they are not licensed to operate. They commute on minibuses that have no franchises authorizing them to provide service. Yet, as de Soto makes emphatically clear,
these are bustling communities, filled with entrepreneurship and
energy.13 They constitute a major part of the wealth of the countries
in which they operate. De Soto’s point is that they could do even
better if they had formal property rights; if they could join the system of private property from which they have been excluded.14
From my perspective, the migrant communities that de Soto
describes operate on the principle of possession—they allocate resources based on perceptions of possession and respect for possession established by others. Moreover—and this is the critical point
in terms of the causation debate—they do so in a context where
everyone knows they do not have ownership rights. The principle of
possession here cannot be explained as a proxy for ownership, because everyone knows these communities are not grounded in formal
property rights. They are a real world instantiation of my hypothesis about a group of people marooned on a desert island. There can
be no claim that the millions of people living in these migrant communities respect possession because it is backstopped by law and
the power of the State. They respect possession because it is the
natural human thing to do.
II. THE FAILED FORMALIZATION PROJECT
The distinction between possession and ownership, and the recognition of the radical difference in the information costs associated with
these two ways of allocating resources, also has important implications for the fate of de Soto’s key policy proposal, which is to formalize
the informal rights to resources that people have in migrant communities in developing nations. A major reason for formalizing these
rights of possession, de Soto argues, is to create a foundation for
13. HERNANDO DE SOTO , THE OTHER PATH 17–127 (1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER
PATH ].
14. See DE SOTO , MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 15–37.
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secured lending based on the collateral in these resources. This injection of capital, he argues, would allow the occupants of these
migrant communities to start or expand a business, or otherwise
improve these resources, which would jump start economic growth
and promote greater equality.15
The evidence to date indicates that this formalization project, where
it has been carried out, has generally failed to achieve its announced
objective. A number of country-specific case studies suggest that the
urban poor who receive these formalized rights do not use them to
obtain secured loans. Instead, once formalization occurs, they frequently cash out by selling to larger landholders or developers.16
Perhaps most critically, in light of the argument de Soto advanced
in support of formalization, a comprehensive review of the literature
by two World Bank researchers reports that evidence of improved
access to credit “is scant.”17
There are undoubtedly a variety of explanations for why formalization projects have failed to achieve economic lift-off in developing
countries. For example, if formal titles are distributed in such a way
that they conflict with customary rights, this can give rise to conflict
between indigenous populations and formal rights holders.18 Or, if
state institutions are too weak or corrupt to enforce formal titles effectively, control over resources may revert to informal rights holders.19 These sorts of explanations, however, do not seem to account
for the failure of formalization to stimulate secured lending in the
migrant communities that have emerged in and around major cities
in developing countries. With respect to these communities, there
is no conflict between the person in possession and the person with
newly formalized title—they are one and the same. And as de Soto
15. See id. at 153–205.
16. BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THEORY
AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 148–50 (2012); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Leaving the
Body of Property Law? Meltdowns, Land Rushes, and Failed Economic Development, in
HERNANDO DE SOTO AND PROPERTY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 90–91 (B. Barros ed., 2010); John
Gravois, The De Soto Delusion, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/hey_wait_a_minute/2005/01/the_de_soto_delusion.html.
17. Deininger & Feder, supra note 4; see also NIALL FERGUSON , THE ASCENT OF MONEY
278 (2008) (citing evidence that only four percent of squatters given formalized title in Quilmes,
Argentina managed to secure a mortgage).
18. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World
Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996, 1038–42 (2006).
19. Id. at 1042–45.
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points out, most of the countries where these migrant communities
are located have already established systems of land title registration and enforcement—which work tolerably well for the elite who
own and trade in conventional property rights.20
There is an alternative and more parsimonious explanation for
the failure of formalization to stimulate secured lending in migrant
communities. Once we understand the distinction between possession and ownership, and the information-cost reasons for making
possession the general default principle in allocating resources, the
failure of formalization to induce secured lending should not be
surprising. The most general explanation is that the rights in question are not sufficiently valuable to justify the higher information
costs associated with determining ownership of property. More
specifically, the failure of these formalized rights to stimulate secured lending can be pinpointed to two factors.
First, a bank or other lender will enter into a secured loan only if
the expected return on the loan exceeds the costs of establishing
that the borrower has the relevant ownership rights to provide collateral for the loan. From de Soto’s account of migrant communities,
it seems clear that the original value of the individual formalized
rights—to a small plot of land improved by a homemade shack for
example—will be small. Thus, at least initially, lenders may conclude that the return on entering into a secured loan will be too
small to justify the costs of verifying title to the collateral.
Let me elaborate. One can characterize the decision by a bank or
other lender to engage in secured lending with a simple formula.
The bank makes money by charging interest on loans that is higher
than its cost of capital. This is known as the interest rate spread.
The amount of money the bank will make on any particular loan is
a function of the spread times the principal value of the loan. Suppose the spread is two percent and the principal value of the loan is
ten thousand dollars. The expected return is .02 times $10,000 or
$2,000. (I ignore the complication of discounting the expected return
over time and so forth.) In deciding whether to enter into the loan,
the bank will compare this expected return to various costs it will
incur in making the loan, such as origination costs, collection costs,
20. See DE SOTO , MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 73–74, 153.
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the risk of loss on default, and so forth. For present purposes, I will
focus on only one cost—the cost of doing a title search.
Suppose, to continue my hypothetical, the cost of a title search is
three thousand dollars. On this assumption, the loan, which will
generate expected revenue of two thousand dollars, will not be made.
Clearly this will be true if the bank bears the cost of verifying title
to the collateral. It is also not likely to be made if the bank shifts the
cost of verifying title to the collateral onto the borrower, through an
origination fee. The borrower would have to earn a very high rate of
return on the borrowed funds, above and beyond the interest payments on the loan, in order to cover the cost of the title search,
which I have posited to be three thousand dollars.
The lesson we derive from this simple example is that the decision to engage in secured lending is critically dependent on the
principal value of the loan. At a minimum, the principal value of the
loan must be large enough to exceed the costs of a title search and
the other costs of originating and managing the loan. If the cost of
a title search is positive, as it always will be, then the principal value
of the loan must be large enough to cover the title search costs.
Neither the bank nor the owners of newly formalized plots of land
who are the target of the formalization reform effort will be interested
in participating in securing lending if the principal value of the loan
is too small to cover the costs of verifying title to the collateral.
Some indirect confirmation of this observation is provided by
looking at a relatively unusual market for secured lending in the
United States—where the collateral takes the form of a lease. There
is no conceptual reason why a tenant cannot use her lease as collateral for a loan. Obviously this is uncommon. I have never heard of
a residential tenant with a year-to-year lease securing a loan by
posting the tenancy as collateral. There are examples of leases being
used as collateral in the commercial lending context. Grocery stores,
for example, commonly enter into twenty to twenty-five-year leases
for the buildings in which they operate, and they have used these
leases as collateral for securing revolving lines of credit. Typically,
multiple leases are bundled together in a single package of collateral. This makes sense—the more leases that are bundled, the
larger the collateral and the bigger the principal amount of the loan.
Owners of cooperative apartments are another example. Persons
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who buy cooperative apartments today can obtain mortgages to
purchase their apartment unit. Technically the assets that secure
the mortgage are the shares the unit owner holds in the cooperative
corporation. But the only reason the shares have any economic value
is because they come with a long-term lease of a particular apartment unit, which is often worth one million dollars or more in a
market like New York City.21
These examples of leasehold mortgages show that secured lending
is nonexistent when the lease has a relatively small value, as would
be the case for a short-term residential lease. When the value of the
leasehold is large, either because it is a major commercial lease or
because it is a very long-term residential lease, we see that secured
lending, like magic, appears. I take this as confirmation that secured lending is feasible only when the value of the collateral, and
hence the principal amount of the loan, is sufficiently large to justify
the costs of performing a title search and the other costs associated
with originating and managing the loan.
Second, secured lending works only if there is a credible threat by
the lender to foreclose on the collateral if the loan is in default. This
is not because lenders have any desire to take possession of the collateral. Taking possession of the collateral is usually a losing proposition for the lender.22 The reason lenders prefer to make loans secured
by collateral is that this gives them enhanced leverage to persuade
borrowers to continue making payments on the loan. Such leverage
will exist only if the lender has a credible threat to foreclose and
take possession of the collateral. And the threat to foreclose will be
credible only if the costs of foreclosure process are less than the
value the collateral will obtain on a sale once it is seized.23
Foreclosure of real estate in the United States is expensive, often
entailing a judicial hearing and, if the mortgagor does not voluntarily relinquish possession, an eviction procedure carried out by the
sheriff’s office. Because of various statutory redemption rights, foreclosure is also value destroying—reducing the price the foreclosed-upon
21. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An
Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD . 275, 281 (2007).
22. Ronald Mann, The Concept of Collateral, in CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL
FINANCE (2017).
23. By “costs of the foreclosure process” I refer to the costs of gaining possession of the
collateral and selling it to recover some or all of the principal value of the loan.
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property can obtain in a sale by as much as forty percent.24 Foreclosure on delinquent auto loans—it’s called repossession in this
context—is less costly. Still, it entails using “repo” men to find the
vehicle and tow it away in the dead of night, which can lead to
conflict or litigation.
In contrast, when we consider a third type of secured lending, the
costs of foreclosure are very small. Pawnshops loan money to individuals secured by collateral in the form of personal property, like
jewelry, musical instruments, guns, and so forth. The unique aspect
of pawnshops is that possession of the collateral is transferred to the
shop for the duration of the loan. There are a variety of explanations
for this practice, but surely one is that the costs of foreclosure are
dramatically reduced when the collateral is already in the hands of
the lender. If the borrower defaults, the pawnshop just takes the
collateral off the shelf and sells it. If the collateral remains with the
borrower, it would be prohibitively expensive, relative to the value
of the collateral, to hire a repo man to seize possession of the guitar or
engagement ring that secures the loan, even assuming the repo man
could gain entrance to the dwelling where these objects are kept.
We can again see that the value of the collateral is critical by
comparing the practice of pawnshop lending to other forms of secured lending using personal property as collateral. Various forms
of personal property, such as autos, airplanes, and boats, serve as
collateral for secured loans. Like guitars and engagement rings, and
unlike land, they are moveable and concealable. Yet for these highvalued forms of personal property, the collateral stays with the
borrower. The costs of repossession are sufficiently low, relative to
the value of the collateral, to make this feasible. The fact that pawnshops insist on a transfer of possession to the lender as a condition
for making the loan reflects the relatively high costs of foreclosure
relative to the value of the collateral. So the historical experience of
pawnshops provides some confirmation that low-valued collateral
will not support a robust system of secured lending—unless possession of the collateral is transferred to the lender before the loan is
made. And of course, in the case of the plots of land and the fixtures
described by de Soto, transfer of possession to the lender in advance
24. Mann, supra note 22 (citing statistics on commercial real estate loans indicating that “a
typical foreclosure sale results in a loss to the lender of about 40% of its original loan amount”).
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of the loan would defeat the very purpose of generating a market in
secured credit to jump start economic growth.
There is another, cultural reason why the threat of foreclosure is
unlikely to be credible with respect to newly formalized land. Foreclosure entails a willingness to allow ownership rights to trump
possessory rights. If the dominant ethos of the squatter community
is possession, it may be difficult to accept the idea that a lender can
oust a possessor for nonpayment of a loan. There is a parallel here
to the behavior of the so-called claims associations in the United
States in the nineteenth century, which refused to allow squatters
to be displaced by persons who had purchased land in formal land
sales.25 Over time, it is reasonable to think that the ethos of the
squatter community will give way to a sensibility that recognizes
the necessity of periodic foreclosures of debtors who, for whatever
reasons, cannot repay the loan. But it is likely to take some time and
experience with the process of secured lending and periodic foreclosure to develop such an ethos.
III. OTHER PATHS
I am highly sympathetic to the basic reform strategy outlined by
de Soto, which is to bring migrant communities into the world of
modern capitalism by enhancing the security of their rights to material possessions, and giving them access to credit markets so that
they can engage in small scale entrepreneurial enterprises. If formalization of possessory rights does not work to yield these results,
are there other ideas that might work better?
Perhaps the most widespread proposal for creating enhanced opportunities for access to capital among the world’s poor goes by the
name microfinance. Although there are many variations, the root
idea is to establish nonprofit entities, which obtain funding from
developed countries or international organizations and then make
small unsecured loans to individuals in developing countries for
purposes of improving land, starting businesses, and so forth.26 These
have achieved mixed success. The literature about the promise and
25. DE SOTO , MYSTERY, supra note 1, at 108–48.
26. See generally Katherine Hunt, The Law and Economics of Microfinance, 33 J. L. &
COM . 1 (2014).
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perils of microfinance is vast. There have been some ingenious proposals for using social pressure to encourage repayment of loans.
But because these proposals generally do not entail any modification
of property institutions, I have little to say about them.
An alternative that would entail modification of property institutions would be to pursue a formalization strategy, along the lines
proposed by de Soto, but on a much more modest basis. Perhaps the
central flaw in de Soto’s formalization project is that it seeks to leap
from possessory rights to property rights in one large bound. A more
promising approach might be to start more modestly with formalization of possessory rights, rather than trying to transform possessory
rights into property rights. De Soto himself has shown that in some
of the shantytowns and favelas he describes, the possessors post
signs on their holdings attesting to their possessory rights. He has
also developed evidence that possessory rights are transferred within
these communities.27
This suggests that a more modest reform, with arguably greater
prospect of success, would be to create a system of documentary
proof of possession. The possessors of small plots of land and fixtures
would be given official pieces of paper describing and attesting to
their possession of a particular plot of land and associated fixtures.
Persons having the relevant certificate of possession could call on
the State to repel trespassers. Transfers of the certificates would
signify a transfer of possession. The State of Minnesota has adopted
a program of certificates of possessory title which could serve as a
potential model for such a reform.28
Legalization of possessory rights in this fashion should enhance
the security of these claims by allowing disputes over possession to
be resolved through a legal process rather than relying solely on
self-help or social pressure. Among other benefits, this would allow
household members to leave the family plot during the day to seek
employment, rather than require at least one member to remain on
the premises to stand guard against usurpers.29 It would also facilitate the transfer of possessory rights from one claimant to another.
27. See DE SOTO , THE OTHER PATH , supra note 13, at 25–26.
28. Kimball Foster, Certificates of Possessory Title: A Sensible Addition to Minnesota’s
Successful Torrens System, 40 WM . MITCHELL L. REV. 112 (2013).
29. See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru,
122 Q.J. ECON . 1561 (2007).
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One could envision such a system of formalized possessory rights
evolving into the basis for secured lending, at least on a neighborhood
level. Perhaps over time it would evolve into something like full-blown
property. At least a Humean can imagine that this would be possible.
Another potential reform would be to encourage the development
of firms devoted to compiling credit scores of individuals who participate in the informal economies of migrant communities. Historically, the primary forms of personal lending were based either on
the reputation of the borrower as known to the lender or on the
posting of collateral to secure the loan. Modern economies (like the
United States) have developed a third form: what can be called
algorithmic lending. The basic idea here is to gather data on the
past behavior of the potential borrower and process it through an
algorithm that predicts the probability of repayment of a loan. The
most familiar example is credit card borrowing, where the issuance
of the card and determination of the credit line is based on an algorithmic analysis of the borrower’s historical pattern of behavior in
participating in financial transactions, most prominently as distilled
through a so-called credit score. Similar techniques are widely used
in assessing applicants for purchase money loans for autos, homes,
and the like. Recent studies suggest that even peer-to-peer lending,
which was originally conceived as an alternative form of finance
that would break free of conventional forms of lending, has largely
been subsumed by institutions that rely heavily on credit scores and
algorithmic analysis of borrower characteristics.30
All of which suggests that developing economies might do much
to enhance access to finance capital by promoting (or even subsidizing) the emergence of firms devoted to compiling the data needed to
develop algorithmic lending. The development of such an industry
requires that there be some method of compiling information about
the past behavior of the borrower in paying off various obligations,
which in turn can be synthesized into a credit score. If a person has
a history of consistent repayment of obligations, their credit score
goes up, resulting in greater access to credit from various sources.
The system works only if information can be shared among lenders
about the past performance of borrowers, which requires some
30. Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer
Lending and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603 (2015).
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assurance of confidentiality. This in turn requires the enactment
and enforcement of appropriate legislation allowing sharing of information while protecting against unauthorized disclosure. If appropriate legislation providing these assurances can be adopted, the
information can be distributed digitally, at much lower cost than is
associated with verifying ownership of collateral and engaging in
the process of foreclosure.
The trick in extending algorithmic lending to the urban poor in
developing countries lies in getting them into the system of making
purchases using credit. Obviously, a legal infrastructure must be in
place, which permits the assembly of information about individual
behavior with respect to credit along with appropriate assurances
of confidentiality. If this is established, then perhaps the poor could
start with simple debit cards, based on prepaid credit balances.
Once individuals have established a history of proper usage of such
debit cards, banks might be willing to offer them credit cards with
small lines of credit. Successful management of the credit card would
lead to larger and larger credit lines, to the point where the borrower would be able to finance a small shop or other entrepreneurial
venture. None of this will be easy for developing countries to achieve.
But the information-cost demands should be much lower than that
associated with secured lending, at least when the value of the
collateral is relatively small relative to the value of the loan.
CONCLUSION
Hernando de Soto’s pioneering work on migrant communities in
developing countries provides important insights into the relationship between possession and ownership. His studies help us see that
an extensive system of allocating resources by possession occurs on
a widespread basis in contexts where possessory rights cannot be
regarded as proxies for ownership. His advocacy of formalization of
possessory rights into ownership, in order to jump-start secured lending to the individuals living in these migrant communities, has largely
failed. Once we understand that the roots of this failure lie in the
very high information costs associated with systems of ownership,
we are in a better position to identify alternative strategies for making capital more widely available to persons in these communities.

